providers and purchasers are common in health system. Health care providers are looking for higher medical tariffs and getting more financial resources and on the other side purchasers are trying to have more strict control on financial resource management. Likewise, these conflicting interests in Iran between Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME) as the main health care provider and health insurance funds as the main purchasers of health care services have been one of the limiting factors for health reforms, for instance, it caused financial challenges for the Health Transformation Plan (HTP) in Iran that was initiated in 2014. The behavior of decision makers being affected by conflicting interests is aligned with rational choice theory or public choice theory, which uses economic approach to analyze political behavior. Based on this theory, individuals act in their own best interests and this self-interested behavior by individuals may influence the policy process. 9 
| Context: Health insurance funds in Iran
Iranian fragmented health insurance system is one of the major sources of health financing. According to the National Health Account of Iran in 2014, basic health insurance schemes accounted for 26% of the total health care expenditures. Different types of health insurance funds exist without adequate provisions for transfer or redistribution of cross subsidy between them. There are multiple health insurance funds in Iran with different population sizes, ranging from less than 50 000 to about 37 million people that exacerbate fragmentation in the overall risk pool. 10 There are four main public health insurance organizations in the country. Social Security Organization (SSO) is one of the largest health insurance organizations, which covers all the people employed in the formal private sector and their dependents. Social Security Organization runs its own health care facilities, which provides free of charge health services for its beneficiaries. The Iran Health Insurance Organization (IHIO), as a public health insurance organization, has four subfunds that provide health insurance for government employees and their dependents, rural residents, the self-employed (Iranians fund) and their dependents, and other sectors (such as students and some professional associations). The Armed Forces Medical Services Insurance Organization provides health insurance for military personnel and their families. And finally, Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation Health Insurance that provides health insurance coverage for the poor. 11, 12 In addition to these main insurers, there are 17 smaller institutional health insurance funds. 13, 14 Enjoying high financial resources, these institutions provide generous health benefit packages, covering almost all health services available with few exceptions and more importantly providing high financial protection for their patients using health care services even in the private health sector while having no contribution to the whole risk pool. 13 These 17 funds are called better-off minor funds in this article.
Fragmentation in the Iranian health insurance financing is rooted in incremental extension of insurance coverage over the time resulting from contextual barriers like low fiscal space. Fragmentation has directly or indirectly caused new problems for the health financing system like inequality in access to health care 13, 15 ; inefficiency in health insurance system; high out-of-pocket expenditures 12, 15, 16 ; low financial protection against health services for the insured persons 17, 18 ; the high coinsurance rates; and insurance coverage duplication, 12, 17 lack of transparency, and absence of reliable data and statistics for health insurance policy making. 17 Fragmentation also hinders moving towards financial objective of universal health coverage such as the reduction of the financial burden of using health care for patients because fragmentation reduces the potential degree of risk redistribution from a given amount of prepaid funds. 19 Combining prepaid funds together ideally in a single pool rather than keeping them in separate funds has Insurance) physically together. This policy aimed to put an end to fragmentation in risk pools and centralize policy making for health insurance system in one organization. 14 Over the last few decades, several main laws have been passed to reduce problems resulting from fragmentation in health insurance system without touching physical structure or financial and managerial autonomy of health insurance schemes. One of the main purposes of passing these laws including "Universal Health Insurance Act" and establishment of High Council of Health Insurance (HCHI) in 1994, 11 "Organizing Health Act" in 2002, 24 and the law of "Comprehensive Structure of Welfare and Social Security" 25 in 2004 was to tackle fragmentation by implementing "Virtual integration" among health insurance funds (here means that health insurance funds while keeping their organizational autonomy follow the same insurance policies such as the same method for contribution rates, the same benefit package, and the same preset principles for contracting providers). Little progress has been made in the accomplishment of expected goals of these laws at least to some degree due to resistance of powerful actors. 16, 25 It indicates that decision of merging health insurance schemes physically that touches financial and managerial autonomy and institutional structure of schemes would be much more difficult to implement. Consolidation of fragmented risk pools is a tough political decision bearing in mind the pros and cons and unwillingness of strong policy actors to lose their autonomy. 26 In 2004, a purchaser-provider split occurred in the Iranian health system. As a result of this separation, The Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor and Social Welfare (MoCLSW) was established and health insurance schemes and HCHI were transferred to MoCLSW to improve strategic purchasing in order to enhance quality of health services for the beneficiaries. High Council of Health Insurance became responsible to make the policy and regulate public health insurance schemes under the MoCLSW. 27 Policy making for the health system and the health insurance schemes has been undertaken since then in MoHME and MoCLSW separately.
Experience from Turkey, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia on reducing fragmentation in health insurance system over the last years also shows that it has not been an easy decision to implement. There were strong actors who strongly opposed creating single health insurance. Government, workers unions, academics and civil groups, selfemployed workers, employers and industrial workers, existing health insurance schemes, medical associations, technocrats in Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labor, trade unions, political parties, private sector, and civil society were among the main actors that had different positions regarding merging. Some of them were strongly against it and caused a lot of challenges and disagreed openly with consolidation of health insurance schemes. [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] Dynamism and mobility of policy actors is a common feature of high politics changes such as creating a single national scheme as a result of merging the existing health insurance funds together, which can influence quite a wide range of powerful actors. 38 So it is vital to identify all relevant actors interested in consolidation, classify them based on their position (support and opposition), and define their power and resources they might to mobilize to affect the policy implementation. [38] [39] [40] More important is to know why they are against consolidation and recognize their sources of resistance.
Recognizing these interests can help policy makers to predict actors' reactions and design appropriate strategies to reduce their opposition or even change their position regarding given policy. In the present article, we are going to focus on the interests and benefits of key health insurance actors in Iran as a critical factor, which can influence the implementation of consolidation law. This article aims to reveal which actors may lose or gain benefits as a result of merging health insurance schemes in Iran. The results of this study as lessons from Iran's experience can be informative and applicable for other countries with fragmented health insurance system that are planning to move towards merging risk pools together.
2 | METHODS
| Participants and interviews
This qualitative study is part of a large study about "analysis for policy" of merging social health insurance (SHI) funds in Iran. In this article, stakeholder analysis approach was applied to shed light on the main policy actors and players of health insurance system, the relationships among them, their interest, position, sources of power, and the degree of their influence on the policy implementation (Table 1) . 38, 41, 42 The main focus of the article is to illuminate the main benefits that actors might lose or gain as a result of merging health insurance schemes in Iran, which may hinder or accelerate implementation of merger. Analyzing all of these factors can help policy makers and implementers to follow a more realistic approach to have a more sustainable policy implementation. 43 The main source of data was semi-structured interviews. To gather sufficient information to cover all aspects of the merging health insurance funds, it was tried to identify all the key stakeholders as much as possible. The stakeholders were selected with high maximum variation from different organizations. 44 Using purposeful sampling, key informants with the relevant education, experiences, and researches in the areas of health system and health insurance were selected. During the initial interviews, other stakeholders and informants were added to the list through snowball sampling, 45, 46 and the information derived from the analysis of interviews and documentary reviews.
Some key interviewees had several organizational positions in different health insurance organizations over the past years. Sixty face-to-face interviews were conducted. Interviews were continued until no more key informant and stakeholder were identified, and saturation was reached.
| Data collection
Depending on the interviewee's experience, the prepared questions were asked to get the most detailed and practical information. At the start of each interview by explaining the purpose of the interview and ensuring the confidentiality of the content of the interviews and anonymity, interviews were taped with two sound recorders. In three cases, the participants did not allow voice recording, so we took notes of the main points. Relevant policy documents including TV programs about the merger law, the Parliament (Majlis) proceedings, reports published in organizational journals or newsmagazines, and news interviews were analyzed to supplement data collection as well. For the purpose of the study, in interviews we tried to disclose which stakeholders are against/for merging health insur- 
| Data analysis
Two authors (M.B. and A.R.) analyzed and indexed the transcribed interviews using thematic approach assisted by MAXQDA12 software. At first, all kinds of interests or benefits that each actor might lose or gain by merger of health insurance funds were extracted from interviews. As it was expected that interviewees do not like to mention or talk about their personal benefits and the reasons why they support or oppose merger, at this stage, the main concern was to ensure that all kinds of self-interests that might influence stakeholders' decision regarding merger had been identified. For this purpose, all identified interests of actors were discussed among the members of research team which were knowledgeable and experienced enough in the fields of health system and health insurance schemes.
The discussions among research members helped gain two main objectives: first to identify other potential benefits not mentioned by the interviewees and second to categorize the interrelations between sources of benefits. Findings were classified in five categories and 13 subcategories.
Information about the interest and influence of actors both ranging from high to low and also their positions (support, oppose, or neutral) (Table 4) were assessed and agreed on based on following items: interviewees' responses about their own roles and the status of the other stakeholders; the quality of actors' reactions manifested in reports, news, and mass media; their active actions taken during the process of passing the law in the parliament, analysis of related documents, and finally the authors' interpretation and judgment.
2.2 | Findings 2.2.1 | The role and involvement of main stakeholders of Iranian health insurance system Table 2 shows details of the current role and situation of all identified stakeholders of current fragmented health insurance system in Iran.
| The interest, position, and influence of the stakeholders
As illustrated in Table 4 Law. IHIO supports the policy of merging but has no power to force other schemes to merge into it. Social Security Organization as a nongovernmental scheme is severely against the policy and has political and financial power to affect the policy implementation. Armed Forces Medical Services Insurance Organization has a high influence to hinder the policy execution but oppose moderately because it is exempted from merging based on the Consolidation Law. Table 3 shows more details about the interest, position, and influence for other stakeholders.
All identified benefits as the reasons to resist or support merger were categorized into five main categories and 13 subcategories, which are presented in Table 4 . ▪ A governmental organization with four subfunds which provides health insurance for government employees and their dependents, rural residents, the self-employed (Iranians fund) and their dependents, and other sectors (such as students, some professional associations and so on);
▪ involving in making health policy as a member of High Council of Health Insurance (HCHI);
▪ Purchaser of health care services from MoHME, private sector and SSO' health facilities;
▪ Chosen organization for merging other health insurance schemes into it based on the fifth Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan;
3 The Social Security Organization (SSO)
▪ One of the largest health insurance organizations which covers all the people employed in the formal private sector and their dependents ▪ Running its own health care facilities providing free health care for its beneficiaries ▪ Purchaser of health care services from MoHME, private sector and its own health facilities Incremental approach for extending health insurance coverage usually leads to multiple insurance schemes for different segments of population with different benefit packages. But once formed, it is very politically difficult to merge these multiple insurance schemes together because it means that privileged groups should lose their benefits in favor of the poor. One strong source of resistance against merging is from health insurance schemes with generous benefit packages; especially in Iran where based on law other schemes must be merged into IHIO with the weakest benefit package. Their resistance originates from previous perception of inadequate benefit package, low performance, and low level of contribution rate in IHIO. Creating a single fund means at least for the basic benefit package, those health insurance schemes with generous benefit package must share their benefit with other groups like rural residents, governmental employees, poor people, and self-employed individuals. … while discussing on passing a law to set a proportional method for increasing premium (moving away from regressive premiums) in parliament, public representatives as legislators were busy with calculators to calculate how much would be deducted from their salary for premium, and they put a limiting ceiling on salary for premium deductions, for example they reduced the ceiling of 5 fold of the minimum wage for premiums deduction to the 2 folds of the wage. It means they don't care only about public and health insurance system as a whole, they worry about their benefits as well … (Senior Expert from
Budget and Planning Organization)
One of the main sources of resistance to create a single fund in Iran is differences among health insurance schemes in financial area like contribution rate and wage ceiling and percentages of wages for premium deduction.
In general, governmental schemes suffer more from financial shortages. The first requirement for merging health insurance schemes emphasized by most of interviewees was revising and defining an acceptable contribution rate for all schemes. Increasing the premium for some governmental insurance schemes like rural residents, civil servants, and poor people has been mentioned as the first step to mind the gap financial inputs between rich and poor schemes. It indicates that establishing a single national fund requires more financial support by the government and also increases government contribution as the employer for the related schemes, whereas over recent years government has evaded to increase its share of premiums. Given unwillingness of government to do so, some interviewees said … at the time of discussing consolidation law in the parliament, the main challenge was how a single fund can be established by merging existing SHI schemes together while the premiums between them are different!! How we can pool the rural residents fund with Social Security Organization for the workers, while rural people pay nothing?!! For solving this challenge, we proposed 7 percent of minimum salary for governmental schemes but it was not passed because government disagreed and could not afford it. Finally 5 percent was approved … (Senior expert from Budget and Planning
Organization)
… Government is unwilling to increase its share of premiums as the employer … (A senior manager from IHIO)
Some interviewees believe that the government can benefit from merging. The government has to pay a high amount of budget annually as the employer for health insurance premiums of several groups of population. Centralizing statistics of insured population can solve the problem of duplication in population coverage that means the government will pay less budget than what it pays now. Also, reducing administrative cost as a result of merging can lead to saving public budget.
| BENEFITS RELATED TO HEALTH FACILITIES AFFILIATED WITH HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES

| Conflict of interest arising from running health facilities by health insurance schemes
Ownership of health facilities by health insurance organizations and delivering health services in these facilities for beneficiaries would not be without problems. Apart from advantages that ownership of health facilities can have for beneficiaries, it would have conflicting effects on health policy making and health reforms including setting medical tariffs, setting benefit package, pricing, strategic purchasing, service utilization, payment, etc, due to conflict of interest. Some interviewees said regarding this … I can not be the provider and purchaser of health services at the same time. SSO purchases health services from its own health facilities!! As a result, at meetings about service delivery, SSO supports higher prices because it sells health services in its facilities, when it comes to purchasing, it supports low medical tariffs. It is conflict of interest … (A senior manager from IHIO)
… when a health insurance scheme has its own health facilities, it will influence its policies and affects strategic purchasing negatively. When working in HCHI to increase tariffs for different services for example medical services and hoteling, SSO' representative takes into account benefit of SSO' health facilities, that is he does not care just about strategic purchasing …(A senior manager from IHIO)
| Concerns about losing or sharing free of charge health services in facilities with other insured groups
As mentioned before, some beneficiaries access to free health services in facilities belong to their own health insurance to their health care providers working in their health facilities. These differences also matter for the amount of contributions that beneficiaries have to pay at the point of health service utilization in different kinds of health facilities.
For example, in insurance schemes with their own health facilities, beneficiaries can access to free health services, in other rich schemes, beneficiaries can access to free health services in both public and private health facilities. But in IHIO, beneficiaries are financially supported based on public medical tariffs even in private facilities, so beneficiaries have to cover the gap between public and private medical tariffs in private health centers, which is a major source of out-of-pocket health expenditures. These differences are sources of concern for other insurance schemes.
… SSO does not pay to its own health facilities like public and private facilities (use higher tariffs). Armed
Forces Medical Services Insurance Organization also pays higher tariffs to military hospitals … (An expert from Armed Forces Health Insurance)
… IHIO wants to reimburse our health facilities (SSO) as pays to other public and private health facilities?!! (A senior manager from SSO)
… in some health insurance schemes with its own health facilities, managers do whatever they like in their organization and health facilities. They pay bonus to their health providers as much as they like. If creating single fund be implemented, this would be clear, then they can not pay this much of bonus to their personnel. Who are engaged in paying bonus? Those who regulate it!! When tracking it, you'll see it is conflict of interest. In some schemes, bonus for a physician is 5 times more than a ordinary employee, 5 time more than amount of salary that we pay to our employees here in IHIO. They are worried about these benefits, because of that they don't like merging all existing SHI schemes together, and it won't be done … (A senior policy maker from IHIO)
| Less financial authority and possibility of facing less financial resources
Some of health insurance organizations in Iran like SSO and Petroleum Industry Health Organization have launched their own health facilities to provide free health services for their beneficiaries. These health facilities are funded through budget, which comes from their beneficiaries' premiums. As mentioned before, all SHI schemes were supposed to be merged into IHIO based on the law. So IHIO would be the only scheme responsible for pooling and purchasing health services for all groups of population. It means that premiums used for running health facilities should be transferred to IHIO first. So health facilities of mentioned health insurance schemes would be financed through an intermediate agent, here IHIO, and this would lead to a delay in access to financial resources required for running facilities, which once were their own. Another concern mentioned by interviewees was related to possibility of transferring budget between health facilities belonging to schemes like SSO and Petroleum Industry Health Organization.
They insisted that consolidation limit the possibility of transferability of budget between their health facilities. Currently, these schemes fix budget deficit of losing facilities in some regional with budget from profitable facilities in other regions. This would be less possible by entrusting premiums to IHIO because IHIO will reimburse them based on the number of people who get health services from those facilities, so those facilities in less populous cities will face financial shortfall.
… we have some health facilities in some places which are not profitable, but we have to keep those facilities despite high administrative costs because of health needs of our beneficiaries. With consolidation, IHIO will reimburse these facilities based on persons who live in those places and use health services … (A senior manager from Petroleum Industry Health Organization)
6 | BENEFITS RELATED TO SOCIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION 6.1 | Interactions of health benefit package with other kinds of long-term commitments in SSO
One of the challenges facing merging SHI schemes in Iran is related to integration of health benefit package to other kinds of obligations in SSO like pension, disability, and unemployment. In an article about trend of health section development in SSO, it was written that "social insurance and health insurance services meet the welfare and health needs of public respectively and health benefit is an indivisible part of social insurance system". Also SSO' experts emphasize that all three health financing functions including revenue collection, risk pooling, and purchasing are performed now as an integrated complex in SSO. Then, shifting health commitments in whole or in part to IHIO can have a limiting effect on SSO universality.
Some interviewees considered the health benefit package of SSO as a vitrine for attracting people to register in SSO. By transferring this part to the IHIO, willingness of people to apply for social insurance of SSO would decrease, which in turn can lead to less welfare in the society in the long term.
… health is an urgent need of everybody in the present and in the future. Health benefit package has formed to meet this need. We always say that health benefit package is the window of social insurance organizations. Because young persons who apply for social insurance coverage might not care about their retirement but do care about health needs … (A senior manager from SSO)
Also some experts state that there is a close interaction between different obligations of SSO including health, pension, disability, and other insurances. This has provided the opportunity for SSO to transfer financial resources between health section and other obligations. For example, according to the interviewees' statements, in SSO, health section funds have been used to support financial deficits of other obligations and vice versa. This support and transferability of financial resources between health section and other obligations of SSO would be limited severely by entrusting health premiums to the IHIO as a result of merging.
| Conflict of interest arising from running pharmaceutical companies
Social Security Organization as one of the main health insurance funds in Iran has launched pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies to meet medical needs of its beneficiaries in its own health centers and also as a way for investment to cover long-term expenditures of other obligations like pension and disability. All four public health insurance organizations have one representative in HCHI whose main responsibility is policy making for health insurance system like defining the basic health benefit package to be covered by health insurance organizations. Each representative directly engages in this process and can influence the process of decision making about what kinds of health services, drugs, or medical equipment included in the benefit package. Pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies of SSO can seize this opportunity to put their products into benefit package, something that would be limited (if not impossible) after merging. It is supposed that the constitute of HCHI members should be changed after merging because merging means there would be one public health insurance organization instead of four.
7 | BENEFITS RELATED TO MOHME AND MOCLSW 7.1 | Who would be in charge of IHIO and HCHI after consolidation: MoHME or MoCLSW?
Before the establishment of purchaser-provider split in Iran, health insurance schemes were affiliated with MoHME.
Ministry of Health and Medical Education was both the main provider and purchaser of health services. Sharing power between MoHME and MoCLSW and lack of coordination and more important lack of trust between them caused new problems for health sector as a whole. As a result, over recent years, MoHME has been struggling to take control of health insurance organizations back again. This has made Health insurance experts question the hidden notion of creating single fund in Iran and take a defensive position against merging. They are concerned about the organizational affiliation of health insurance after merging. They believe that merging is the first step to bring back health insurance system under the control of MoHME. One unsolved and contentious ambiguity related to creating a single health insurance among experts during the passing of the law in the Parliament was about the new organizational affiliation, responsibilities, and members of HCHI after consolidation. This challenge was supposed to be solved by proposing a new bill, which has not been delivered until now.
… in my idea we must look at our organizational structures … we must know the organizational affiliation of this organization (IHIO) in the future … where would it be? As far as I know, the next position of this national organization would be within the Health Ministry …(A senior manager from SSO)
… Ministry of health is trying to have health insurance schemes under its control. Because it is the main health care provider and it supervises its hospitals and other health facilities itself! Ministry of health evaluates its grade-C hospitals as the grade-A one!! The main fund of Ministry of health hospitals is from private revenue which comes from health insurance schemes. Ministry of health believes that by having health insurance schemes under its control it can allocate and manage financial resources freely. In the other hand MoCLSW, especially SSO feels that by consolidation they would lose their authority … (Senior expert from Budget and Planning Organization)
7.2 | Domination of physicians in health policy processes as an important obstacle for implementing any kind of health reform against their interests
One of the concerns mentioned by interviewees was related to physicians' conflict of interest as a main obstacle for the implementation of any kind of reform in the health system, which compromise interests of physicians. They emphasized that physicians are influential and dominant actors in all levels of making health policy and veto any kind of reform, which is against their interests.
… How health insurance system can amend health system? It should have money or authority. Authority is meaningless. Whatever health minister says should be done, and he/she is concerned about his/her interest. That is the health system, that's it. Conflict of interest of physicians is beyond that to think about an independent health financing system with such an authority and power to challenge their interests … (A senior manager from IHIO)
All sources of benefits abovementioned with details related to the stakeholders of merging health insurance funds in Iran have been illustrated in Figure 1 . Our study showed that trying to reduce fragmentation in health financing system is as much a political process as a technical one. Identification of all or at least main stakeholders, their position (support or opposition) regarding merging, their interests, their influences, probability of building coalition among allies and opponents to support or oppose consolidation are indispensable to take realistic and more acceptable policies to merge health insurance funds together. 40, 47, 48 Rational choice theory suggests that individuals act in their own best interests and interest groups seek specific benefits for themselves. 9 As shown, there are many stakeholders interested in health insurance system in Iran with conflicting interests. The general source of conflict of interest mentioned pertains to the role and influence of physicians in the health system. It was said that it is very unlikely (if not impossible) to launch any kind of policy in the health system which is against their benefits. Interviewees stated that creating a single insurance organization with more power and authority within the MoCLSW and out of control of physicians is not in line with the interest of MoHME. There is lack of trust between Ministries of MoHME and MoCLSW. Ministry of Health has always criticized that health insurance schemes do not follow its policies. This lack of coordination has been recognized as a reason for failure of health policies especially those that require close financial cooperation between health insurance schemes and Health Ministry. Ministry of Health would prefer to interact with multiple health insurance schemes rather than a single strong one, if proposed single health insurance scheme is supposed to stay in MoCLSW. This fact strengthens implicitly the risk of returning of health insurance schemes to the MoHME after merging, something that health insurance officials are worried about severely. This possibility has made health insurance officials to reject any talk about consolidation altogether. These statements are in accordance with the Theory of Countervailing Powers. In medical sociology, the main consideration has been put on the way in which the physicians have been able to parlay their professional expertise into social privileged, economic power and political influence to repel any policy or countervailing power, which expects to have a limiting effect on their authority and interest. 49 Experiences from the United States indicates that one of the powerful political sources of resistance facing creating National Health Insurance in this country has been the power of physicians which tried to prevent any organized purchasers including state, corporations, or voluntary associations that could offset the interest of physicians. 49 Purchaser-provider split has been a controversy among the experts from MoHME and MoCLSW. While they have condoned this issue in SSO. Social Security Organization plays all roles of insurer, health care provider, health policy maker, and pharmaceutical producer simultaneously. As mentioned through the article, these conflicting roles have caused conflicting interests for the SSO in particular, and health insurance system and health system in general.
While it is stressed on Purchaser-provider split at the macro level of health system, it should be regarded at the micro level (at SSO) as well. It is worth mentioning that on May 5, 2014, an ambitious plan called HTP was implemented in Iran mainly to reduce people's out-of-pocket payments and financial burden in the public health sector. Sharp increase in total health care expenditures after HTP raised concerns regarding the financial sustainability of the HTP, leading MoHME to try to find a solution. At first, MoHME insisted on the merger of SHI funds but could not get any success. Finally, as a substitute, law makers in the parliament decided to transfer the IHIO from the MoCLSW to the MoHME on January 4, 2017. This decision contrasts with the Mega Health Policies approved in 2014, which emphasized the separation of the stewardship, health financing, and provision of health care services in order to boost accountability, actualization of justice, and the provision of high-quality medical care to the people of Iran.
There are several stakeholders with direct interest including small, big, powerful, and powerless health insurance schemes, which are against the law of creating a single national health insurance in the country. According to the theory of stakeholder mobilization, one possible way for these scattered actors to keep their interests in the current health insurance system is to mobilize politically against the implementation of Consolidation Law. The only health insurance scheme that is not seemingly in this coalition is IHIO, which its interest is not at the same direction as others. Based on the law, all existing health insurance funds should be integrated into IHIO, which can bring financial and political interests for the organization and its customers. So it is clear that even the existing health insurance schemes can have opposite positions regarding consolidation according to their interest they might lose or gain as a result of the execution of Consolidation Law.
Beside stakeholder mobilization, diffusion of political authorities like government, Parliament, health insurance schemes, MoHME, and MoCLSW, each actor with its own power, authority, responsibility, and most important conflicting/competing interests is a major impediment for implementation of Consolidation Law. Merging health insurance schemes together in such a political system with powerful actors with totally conflicting interests even within the government including MoHME and MoCLSW is a tough political decision. Facing fragmented health insurance system with multiple actors which their interests are not at the same direction cause additional political challenges for implementation of merging. Some kinds of resistance can be removed by the interference of a higher supervising organization. For example, besides SSO that is a nongovernmental public organization, other health insurance funds are governmental and rely on the governmental budget. In this case, government can decide to merge all governmental health insurance funds forcefully into the IHIO. In the case of MoCLSW and MoHME, it is the government and the Parliament (usually by passing a new law) that finally should decide where the proposed single health insurance should go. The incumbent government as illustrated in Table 2 is in a high position to interfere and implement the Law, but the government is neutral about the implementation and has no interest in doing or not doing the policy.
As far as the government has no interest or time to undertake the responsibility of implementing the Consolidation
Law that may cause additional challenges for the government, other stakeholders like IHIO or MoHME have no power to approach it.
"Power resource" theorists state that markets and politics are the two options that can be applied for the resource mobilization and the reward distribution. As Hicks states workers gathering into organized labor unions can create a labor-based political party to use their "power resources" in order to follow their authorized rights. 50 Navarro argues that one of the contributing reasons for not having national health insurance in the United States is attributed to the lack of a working class movement and labor-based political party. 49, 51 But the role of labor union (Workers House) in creating a national health insurance in Iran is completely opposite. Workers backed by labor union forming about half the whole insured population of Iran enjoy high political and financial power. Social Security
Organization, which provides health insurance coverage for the workers, is a major nongovernmental organization with enormous investment capacities in the country. Social Security Organization runs its own health service centers, which provide free of charge health services for the workers. As discussed through the article, SSO has a lot of interests in various level of the current health insurance system, which does not want to lose or even share with others.
During the fifth Social, Economic, and Cultural Development Plan, SSO enjoying the political and economical power of workers was a key important resistance power facing the creation of a single national health insurance in Iran.
Insured persons with generous health insurance coverage concern about what might happen to their health benefits after merging. Insured privileged population in rich organizations has paid high premiums hoping to use the best health benefits in the case of needs. Creating a single national insurance with the same benefit package for all should take into consideration those high premiums paid in the past. One policy to solve this problem is enhancing the basic benefit package for all in a way which persons with the high premium history not to be absolute losers. In SSO and other health insurance organizations such as petroleum industry health insurance that have launched their own health care facilities, the beneficiaries can enjoy free of charge health care services, a benefit that other groups of population do not access. Also, some insurance schemes especially better-off minor funds have provided the enrollees with extremely generous benefit package. Citizens accustomed to free and generous health care services have made it more challenging to determine a more equitable benefits package for all. In Thailand, the labor unions considered the benefits package under the universal coverage scheme much less than what they already had. Consolidation of three existing schemes and reducing inequity in terms of benefit packages across them still remains unsolved and is a source of concern among policy makers. 32, 33, 35 Self-interested behaviors by individuals become more evident when their organizational affiliation is changed.
Individuals change their positions regarding the consolidation when they are transferred to other organizations with competing interests. Experience from Iranian health insurance context showed that top managers in the MoHME with high supportive position for the consolidation once in the past opposed it severely when they got new organizational position in the health insurance organizations.
| CONCLUSION
In a fragmented health insurance system including multiple actors with competing interests, the actors equipped with legal authority like government, its ministries, and Parliament need to take a more political will for implementing consolidation policy. An in-depth stakeholder analysis is a part of main policy analysis models like policy triangle framework, which is crucial for all phases of policy process. Our findings provided a comprehensive stakeholder analysis that can help policy makers to modify policies for merging health insurance in a way which is more sensitive to stakeholders' interests.
Although our findings are derived from context of Iranian health insurance system, we strongly believe that our findings are applicable for other countries with fragmented health financing systems, which are trying to merge them to strengthen risk pooling.
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